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This paper demonstrates that the medium-term consequences of the Covid 19 shock on developing countries 
depends on how sovereign debt obligations are restructured now. We develop a necessary and sufficient 
condition for sustainable debt restructuring which implies an upper bound on the interest rate which debt is 
restructured. We show that this upper bound on the interest rate is increasing in the level of financing (the sum of 
debt repayments rolled over, debt write-downs and new investment). We use our result to examine the 
sustainability of a debt standstill. Using data from the UN Economic Commission for Africa, we carry out a simple 
calibration exercise to quantify the impact of investment on interest rate charged. We examine the role of 
contingent contracts and show they may have a limited role in ensuring debt sustainability. We examine the role 
of creditor heterogeneity and debtor moral hazard and demonstrate that participation in the debt restructuring 
process by community groups, civil society organisations is key to restoring sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
Even before the global negative shock resulting from the Covid 19 pandemic, a recent report the World Bank (2020) notes 
that total developing country in 2018 registered an increase of 54 percentage points of GDP since 2010. In the first wave of 
the pandemic, the COVID-19 crisis led to a sudden collapse in capital flows to emerging and developing countries. The 
Institute of International Finance estimated that portfolio outflows from emerging market countries amounted to nearly $100 
billion over a period of 45 days starting in late February 2020 (IIF 2020). Total Financial Assistance for 77 Countries have 
amounted to US$ 82.987 billion so far (see https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker). 
Moreover, the countries at high or moderate risk of debt distress are disproportionately fragile and conflict-affected states, 
commodity-dependent countries, and small States. None of this takes account the potential negative consequences of a 
second wave of the pandemic unfolding globally.  
A recent report by the Economic Commission for Africa (2020) points out that relative to an initial forecast of 3.2%, African 
growth rate in 2020 is likely to decline to 1.8 % (in the best case scenario), 0.1%  (in the middle case scenario) to -2.6% (in 
the worst case scenario). They also point out that the yield on 10-year government bonds varies from 11.03% for South 
Africa to 16.67% for Uganda. As the severity of COVID-19 emerged through Feb-Mar, commodity prices plummeted for 
more than 67% of Africa’s exports. Most African bonds are issued in dollars or in euros, making repayment even more 
challenging and raising worries of default. The same report estimates that total stock of outstanding debt in Africa is $400 
billion and calls for $200 billion Covid 19 related funding for Africa (including low and middle income countries).  
Many developing countries are now caught up in a situation of a debt overhang whereby the present value of their existing 
debt is bigger than their ability to generate the expected revenues to cover future debt repayments (Myers (1977), Bulow 
and Shoven (1978)).  
This state of affairs has led to calls for immediate payment standstills (with debt payments postponed in the short-term (see, 
for example, Bolton et.al. (2020)). As the World Bank Report referred to before points out, “Debt service suspension is a 
powerful, fast-acting measure that can bring real benefits to people in poor countries, particularly countries that don’t have 
the financial resources to respond to the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis.” The IMF and the World Bank have been proactive 
in implementing a debt standstill.  The G20 group of countries has agreed to a debt service standstill on bilateral loans for 
a group of 76 low-income countries. Such agreement is essential for the balance sheets of international financial institutions 
such as the IMF as interest rate payments are suspended and sovereign debt is written down.   
The negative shock resulting from Covid 19 was largely unanticipated. In this paper, we show that the medium-term 
consequences of the unanticipated negative shock such as Covid 19 will depend on the debt restructuring process itself. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for a non-contingent debt restructuring proposal to be sustainable is that the interest rate 
at which the debt is restructured is lower than the expected rate of growth by a factor that takes into account the existing 
stock of debt. Our result implies an upper bound on the interest rate which debt is restructured. We show that this upper 
bound on the interest rate is increasing in the level of investment (the sum of debt repayments rolled over, debt write-downs 
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and new finance). For a given level of financing (which can consist of existing debt payments being rolled over as well fresh 
lending), there is an upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured. 
We, then, use our results to examine the sustainability of a debt standstill (with partial payments standstill) and a debt write 
down. We show that there are conditions under which new net financing will be required to ensure a debt standstill is 
sustainable; in the absence of new financing, a substantial debt write down will be required. Using data from a recent report 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA (2020)), we carry out a simple calibration to quantify the 
impact of changes in the level of financing on the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably 
restructured. Our calibration exercise shows that under plausible assumptions on the existing stock of debt and the financing 
needs, there is no positive interest rate at which sustainable debt restructuring can take place: debt restructuring must 
involve a mix of a debt write-down and new financing in the form of outright grants and loans at very low interest rates.     
Will contingent debt contracts (Shiller (1993)) whereby the interest rate paid on sovereign debt is contingent on the state of 
the world that prevails help? On the face of it, it is an attractive idea to ensure that sustainability holds in all future states of 
the world, contingent debt restructuring and can be achieved by linking the interest rate on the restructured debt to future 
GDP growth or future export earnings (Brooke et.al. (2013)). A somewhat surprising result we obtain is that the upper bound 
on the interest rate displays diminishing sensitivity to the future growth rate of a country i.e. its is concave in the future 
growth rate. A key implication is that there cannot be a sustainable contingent debt restructuring proposal with the same 
expected present value as an unsustainable non-contingent debt restructuring proposal. Hence, faced with an unsustainable 
non-contingent debt restructuring proposal, a sustainable contingent debt proposal must entail a debt write-down is 
expected terms or additional financing or both. 
Even if creditor countries and the international organisations such as the G20 and the IMF agree to debt relief, 
disbursements could be diverted.  There are at least two issues that will need to be resolved.   
First, private creditors will demand to be repaid out of the disbursements by official creditors. For instance, the Jubilee Debt 
Campaign have pointed out that 28 countries at high risk of debt default had received $11.3bn (£8.9bn) that would be used 
to meet private sector debt commitments (see https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jul/16/dollar-11bn-in-imf-covid-
19-money-being-used-to-service-debt-says-group-private-lendwers-poorest-nations). Private sector participation in debt 
restructuring will imply that commercial banks who have lent to developing country sovereigns will need to write-down the 
net present value of their loans.  
Second, there is the issue of debtor moral hazard whereby the disbursements are misused for private consumption by elites 
in the debtor states or wasteful, unproductive investment. We consider this issue from the perspective of its domestic political 
economy. Domestic agents are split into two groups, a minority elite and a majority non-elite. Elites are initially organised to 
act collectively in their own interest and have access to international capital markets (so that they can divert a portion of the 
financing via debt restructuring for their own private consumption); non-elites aren’t initially organised collectively and cannot 
access international financial markets. To address this issue, we argue that participation in the debt restructuring process 
by citizens of the debtor state is imperative. We characterize the conditions under which the non-elite are able to organise 
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effectively to acquire decision-making power within the debtor state.  Our formal analysis implies that the participation in the 
debt restructuring process by citizens of the debtor state is key to restoring sustainability. This leads us to suggest an 
UNCTAD road map (UNCTAD 2015) for Africa as a key component of debt restructuring in response to Covid 19 where 
women, public health practitioners, key workers, community groups, civil society organisations participate in the debt 
restructuring process to determine the financing needs of the debtor state, the interest rate at which the financing occurs as 
well as the use of the finance within the debtor state. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an analysis of sustainable debt restructuring.  Section 
3 uses the analysis of Section 2 to examine the sustainability of a debt standstill and its alternatives such as a debt write-
down and contingent debt restructuring. ally and via a calibration; it contains an analysis of creditor participation. Section 4 
is devoted to an analysis of the political economy of the debtor state. The last section concludes.  
2. Characterizing Sustainable Debt Restructuring in a simple model 
We consider the case of a country embarking on a bond‐financed investment project, costing 𝐾𝐾, which lasts two periods 
𝑡𝑡 = 1,2. All the finance is supplied by external creditors who are promised returns of (1 + 𝑟𝑟) in the first period and 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)2 in the second period. So long as resources are available cover these payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is 
greater than (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 and cash flow in period 2 is greater than (1 + 𝑟𝑟)2𝐾𝐾, all is well and the project will run to completion. 
Consider what happens if an unanticipated, exogenous shock (e.g. the Covid 19 pandemic ‘bad luck’) lowers the capacity 
to pay in period 1 below the amount that is due to bond holders i.e. 𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦 < (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 where 𝑦𝑦1 denotes the resources 
available to make debt payments (e.g. tax revenues or export earnings) in period 1 and 𝑦𝑦  is the minimum consumption of 
these resources for domestic purposes by the debtor state in period 1.  
Conditional on the negative shock, there is uncertainty about whether project net worth will be unchanged. This will depend 
on beliefs about the prospect of recovery i.e. whether the negative shock will turn out to be temporary or permanent. A 
temporary shock would correspond to the notion that economies, globally, will emerge, more or less simultaneously from 
the lockdown due to Covid 19 in a V-shaped recovery. An alternative view is that as economies adjust to the shock, there 
will be permanent changes to the global economy due to changes in global supply chains, permanent damage to the health 
of its populations making it a less attractive destination for foreign direct investment, or tourism etc.  
Assuming that 0 ≤ 𝐼𝐼 ≤ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋 is advanced to the sovereign at interest rate 𝑟𝑟′ where(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 −
𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 is the amount owed (a fraction of which) is rolled over and 𝑋𝑋 ≥ 0 is new financing, the probability of recovery is 
denoted by 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) (with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) the shock has permanent negative consequences): recovery implies that at 
𝑡𝑡 = 2, the total capacity to pay is 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦 (without recovery, available resources are  𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦 with 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 < 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻). Throughout 
the paper, we will assume that 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) is an increasing concave function of investment with 𝑝𝑝(0) = 0,𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼) > 0,𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼) <
0. The idea is that the resources freed up by debt restructuring and new financing will be used by the sovereign state to 
store up its capacity to generate resources (e.g. by investing in public health) as it emerges from Covid 19. 
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Remark: Although, for simplicity of exposition, we consider a two-period model, it is worth noting that we can interpret 
second period payoffs as continuation payoffs following debt restructuring arising from an endogenous growth model. Let 
𝑘𝑘 denote the capital labour ratio and 𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼) denote a parameter determining affecting total factor productivity dependent on 
initial public investment 𝐼𝐼 financed by debt2. Per capita output 𝑦𝑦 is given by the production function 𝑦𝑦 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼)𝑘𝑘 + 𝜋𝜋 (where 
𝜋𝜋 is a subsistence level of per capital output  that doesn’t depend on the level of public investment and is always consumed). 
Capital accumulation is described by the equation 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼)𝑘𝑘 − (𝑛𝑛 + 𝑑𝑑)𝑘𝑘, where 𝑠𝑠 denotes the per capita savings rate 
denotes, 𝑛𝑛 the population growth rate, 𝑑𝑑 the depreciation rate. Hence, the growth rate of per capita output is given by the 
equation 1
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=  𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼) − (𝑛𝑛 + 𝑑𝑑). Suppose there is a threshold level of public investment 𝐼𝐼 such that 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼) ≤ (𝑛𝑛 + 𝑑𝑑) 
whenever 𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐼𝐼 and 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴(𝐼𝐼) > (𝑛𝑛 + 𝑑𝑑) when  𝐼𝐼 > 𝐼𝐼. Suppose 𝐼𝐼 is distributed in some interval [𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼] according to the 
distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼). Let 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼 > 𝐼𝐼). The immediate implication is that when 𝐼𝐼 < 𝐼𝐼, then output per capital converges 
to 𝜋𝜋. When 𝐼𝐼 > 𝐼𝐼 output per capita keeps growing over time. Let 𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 = ∆𝐿𝐿 + 𝜋𝜋 (resp. 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻 = ∆𝐻𝐻 + 𝜋𝜋) where ∆𝐿𝐿 (resp. ∆𝐻𝐻) 
is the cumulative output over a 𝑇𝑇 year horizon when 𝑘𝑘0 + 𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑘𝑘� (resp., 𝑘𝑘0 + 𝐼𝐼 > 𝑘𝑘�). Debt restructuring determines the 
initial level of public investment 𝐼𝐼 and hence the prospects for future growth. This interpretation is used explicitly in the 
calibration below. 
Next, we define a debt restructuring proposal as follows: 
Definition 1. The pair (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) is a debt restructuring proposal. 
Given (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), the present value of the refinanced debt will be (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)𝐼𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾. In expected terms, the total 
resources available is 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�. Hence, for restructuring to be sustainable (in expected 
terms), we must have  
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′)𝐼𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�…(1) 
In (1) the assumption is that all money advanced to the sovereign state is used for growth enhancing investment by the 
sovereign state. In practice, of course, this assumption is likely to be violated for two reasons. First, the money advanced 
to the sovereign could be used to bail out individual creditors: so, money advanced by the IMF could be used to bail out 
private creditors. Second, there is the issue of the debtor moral hazard as the some or all the money could be used for non-
productive investment or private consumption. For the moment, we abstract from both these activities; however, we address 
these two issues later in the paper (section 4).  
 
2 Devdas and Pennings (2018) provide evidence that the return to new public investment can be as much as 9% in low income 
countries even accounting for inefficiency and depreciation. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that growth is itself 
increasing in public investment in low income countries as much as is middle income and high income countries although exact 
estimates vary and depend on the estimation method as well as the time horizon (see, for example, Pereira and Andraz (2013), 
Devadas and Pennings (2018)): the longer the time horizon, the higher the effect of an increase in public investment on growth.  
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As 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) ≤ 1, when a debt restructuring proposal is sustainable, at a minimum, the rolled over payment has to be 
feasible when recovery takes place i.e. (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)𝐼𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦; however, as (1) holds in expected terms 
only, without recovery, creditors as a group receive 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦, (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)𝐼𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾�.  
Given a debt restructuring proposal  (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), the expected return is 𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼) = 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�. 
Expected growth is given by the expression:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) =
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)� �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�
𝐼𝐼
=
𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼)
𝐼𝐼
 
and the expected rate of growth is  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 1.  
Next we define an admissible debt restructuring proposal: 
Definition 2. The pair (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) is an admissible debt restructuring proposal if (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) ≥ 0 i.e. the present value of 
restructured debt is non-negative. 
The following proposition provides a basic characterization for an admissible, sustainable debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼):   
Proposition 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for an admissible debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) to be sustainable 
is 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) where 0 < 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) < 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼). 
Proof. Let  𝑥𝑥 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟′). Note that we can rewrite (1) as 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼). As 𝑥𝑥2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≥ 0, we have that 𝑥𝑥 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) = (1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) so that 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼). Next, let 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑥𝑥. Instead of computing the roots of 
the equation 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼), we instead, compute the roots of the equation  
�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)� + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)�2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
− 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) = 0 ……..(2) 
By computation, note that  
�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)� + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)�2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
− 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) = 0 ↔ −𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)�2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
= 0
↔ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)�2 + �𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼)�2 − �2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) +
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
� 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) = 0 
Hence, the roots of equation (2) are given by expression 
𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) + 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾� ±
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
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As �2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) + 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
= � 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)�2 + 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
> � 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
,  it follows that �2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) + 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
� −
��𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
> 0.  
Hence, both roots are positive. Consider, the first root: 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)+𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�+
��𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
. By computation, note that 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) =
−� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�−
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
< 0, so that we must have (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) < 0 so that the restructured 
debt has negative present value and therefore, isn’t admissible. Consider the second root: 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)+𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�−
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
. By computation, note that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) =
−� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�+
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
> 0 
as ��𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
> � 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�. Hence, if we take the second root, we have that the present value of the restructured debt is 
non-negative and when (1) holds, as the LHS of (1) is increasing in 𝑟𝑟′, 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) = 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) 
as required. ∎ 
The above proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for debt restructuring to be sustainable. The intuition 
is as follows. Given that 𝐼𝐼 is advanced to the debtor state for investment at interest rate 𝑟𝑟′, for debt to be sustainable, the 
expected growth rate must be higher than 𝑟𝑟′ by  a factor that takes into account the fact that (1 + 𝑟𝑟’)𝐾𝐾 must still be repaid. 
The following diagram illustrates the characterization of sustainable debt restructuring:  
 
 
 
 
     
Figure 1: Sustainable Debt Restructuring 
Where the interest rate and the growth rate are measured in a common unit of account, in general multi-period models of 
debt sustainability (see, for example, Contessi (2012)) a similar condition is imposed to ensure that the time path of debt 
remains bounded i.e. debt does not explode. However, the point is that the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt 
is restructured may imply that 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ < 1 so that it involves a mix of debt write down and additional finance in the form of 
outright grants and loans at very low interest rates such as disbursements under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) at zero 
interest rates.  
1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) 
1 + 𝑟𝑟’ 
Sustainable Debt 
Unsustainable 
Debt 
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Under the assumption that expected growth is increasing in investment, the next proposition provides an additional, useful 
characterization of sustainable admissible debt restructuring proposals where either the interest rate or the amount of 
investment or both is taken as given:   
Proposition 2: Suppose expected growth is increasing in investment i.e. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0. Then, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) > 0 and 
for each 𝐼𝐼 (respectively, 𝑟𝑟′ s.t. 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ > 0), there exists an upper bound 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) (resp., 𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟′)) such that (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) is an 
admissible sustainable debt restructuring proposal if and only if 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) with 𝑅𝑅�′(𝐼𝐼) > 0 (resp., 𝐼𝐼 ≥  𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) 
with 𝐼𝐼′(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) > 0) and moreover, 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐼𝐼(𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼)) and 𝑅𝑅��𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′)� = 𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′). 
Proof. By Proposition 1, we need to check that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) > 0. By computation: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) =
1
2�
−
1
𝐾𝐾
+
1
2 ��
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾 �
−12
� �
2𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾2
+ �
4
𝐾𝐾 �
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)���� 
Hence, we check that the expression within the curly brackets is greater than zero or equivalently 
1
2 ��
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾 �
−12
� �
2𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾2
+ �
4
𝐾𝐾 �
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)��� >
1
𝐾𝐾
 
We can rewrite the above inequality as  
𝐾𝐾
2
�
2𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾2
+ �
4
𝐾𝐾 �
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)��� > ��
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾 �
1
2
 
Or equivalently as 
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
+ �2�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)��� > ��
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾 �
1
2
 
Which, by taking the square on both sides, reduces to 
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼)2 + 4�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)�2 + 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) +
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼2
𝐾𝐾
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
> �
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
 
Evidently, we can cancel � 𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
 and 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
 from both sides of the inequality. Therefore as long as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) ≥ 0 and we 
must have that   
4(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼)2 + 4�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)�2 + 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) +
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼2
𝐾𝐾
+
4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
> 0 
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which implies 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) > 0 as required. As 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) > 0, the admissible root to the equation Now, 
consider the admissible root of the equation 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) which, by Proposition 1, is 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼). As 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) −
𝜀𝜀′(𝐼𝐼) > 0, it follows that (a) for a given value of 𝐼𝐼 there is a unique solution 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) to the preceding equation which is 
increasing in 𝐼𝐼, and (b) for a given value of 𝑥𝑥 > 0, there is a unique solution  𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥) to the preceding equation which is 
increasing in 𝑥𝑥. Moreover, by construction,  𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐼𝐼(𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼)) and 𝑅𝑅��𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′)� = 𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′). ∎ 
The intuition behind the preceding proposition is straightforward. Given that public investment has a positive impact on 
growth, given a level of investment, it follows that (a) there is an upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be 
sustainably restructured, and vice versa (b) given the interest rate at which debt is restructured, there is a lower bound on 
the level of investment required to ensure sustainability. So again we can depict the characterization of a sustainable debt 
restructuring proposal in a diagram as follows3:  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Upper bounds on the interest rate and lower bounds on investment   
The above diagram illustrates the lower bound on investment given an interest rate 𝑟𝑟′′ and vice versa, the upper bound on 
interest rate given the investment 𝐼𝐼′′ consistent with Proposition 2. Of course, as 𝐼𝐼′′ = 𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′′) it must follow that 1 +
𝑟𝑟′′ = 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼′′).  
3. Evaluating the Sustainability of a Debt Standstill and its Alternatives 
A key issue in current discussions around sovereign debt restructuring in the face of Covid 19 is whether a debt restructuring 
proposal should treat the shock as temporary or as one with potentially permanent consequences. We begin by using our 
results to evaluate the sustainability of a debt standstill; specifically, we characterize the conditions under which debt 
sustainability is restored with a debt standstill and examine whether restoring debt sustainability requires a debt write down 
or new investment both (Section 3.1), carry out a calibration exercise (Section 3.2), examine the potential role of contingent 
debt contracts (Section 3.3) and issues related to private creditor participation in the debt restructuring process (Section 
3.4). 
3.1 Debt Standstill, Debt Write-down and New Investment  
 
3 The assumption of the concave shape of the function 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) is a matter of convenience; in general, it can be either 
concave or convex or neither.  
1 + 𝑟𝑟′ 
𝐼𝐼 
𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) 
1 + 𝑟𝑟′′ = 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼′′) 
𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟′′) = 𝐼𝐼′′ 
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Several commentators have called for an immediate payments standstill (with debt payments postponed in the short-term 
(see, for example, Bolton et.al. (2020)). On April 15, the G20 announced the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), 
which allows the world’s poorest countries — most of them in Africa — to suspend up to $14 billion of debt service payments 
due in 2020 for a group of 76 low-income countries. Some private debt has also been rolled over (Eichengreen 2020).  
We examine the conditions under which a debt standstill will lead to sustainable debt restructuring. In our model, with our 
focus on debt sustainability, the permanent consequences of the shock are endogenous i.e. it depends on the actual debt 
restructuring plan being proposed or implemented. In a debt standstill, all or some repayments on existing debt will be 
temporarily suspended and rolled over to the following period at the original interest rate.  Formally:  
Definition 3. A debt standstill with all or some payments suspended is a debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with 𝑟𝑟′ = 𝑟𝑟 
and 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦]. 
For such a debt standstill to be sustainable (in expected terms) the following inequality must hold for some 𝐼𝐼 ∈
[0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦]: 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)� �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�…(3) 
The following proposition characterizes the conditions under which a debt standstill isn’t sustainable:  
Proposition 3: For 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦,  if 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) (equivalently, 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) when 
𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0), then a debt standstill cannot be sustainable.  
Proof. By Proposition 1, note that a necessary and sufficient condition for a debt standstill to be sustainable is 1 + 𝑟𝑟 ≤
1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) for some 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦]. By Proposition 2, when  𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0,  1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼), 
𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦, it must be the case that 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) for all  𝐼𝐼 ∈ [0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦].  Hence,  a 
debt standstill cannot be sustainable when 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) for 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦. By Proposition 2, 
when  𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0 for 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦, a debt standstill (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) is sustainable if and only if 1 + 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼). The 
conclusion follows. ∎ 
Proposition 3 is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 1 and 2. Its underlying intuition is as follows. Suppose, for 
simplicity, the entire amount owed in period 1 is rolled over.  When a debt standstill isn’t sustainable, restoring sustainability 
requires either 𝑟𝑟′ < 𝑟𝑟 or 𝐼𝐼 > (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 or both. When  𝑟𝑟′ < 𝑟𝑟 in a debt standstill, the present value of the 
restructured debt must be lower than the value of the original debt i.e.  
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 < (1 + 𝑟𝑟) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟)2𝐾𝐾 
which, of course, entails a haircut. The following diagram illustrates the intuition:   
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Figure 3. Sustainable and Unsustainable Debt Standstills   
We define a debt write-down as a debt rollover where all payments due in current period are suspended and there is a 
haircut in the present value of the existing. Formally: 
Definition 4. An admissible debt write-down is a debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with 𝑟𝑟′ < 𝑟𝑟, (otherwise, the restructured 
debt will have negative present value) and 𝐼𝐼 = �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦�. 
The next proposition demonstrates that even when a debt standstill isn’t sustainable, there is always an admissible debt 
write-down that is sustainable:  
Proposition 4: For 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦, there is an admissible sustainable debt write-down (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼); moreover, if 𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0, any admissible sustainable debt write-down (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) must have 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼).  
Proof. That there is an admissible sustainable debt write-down (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼), 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 +
𝑦𝑦 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. Again, if 𝐸𝐸′(𝐼𝐼) > 0,by Proposition 2, any admissible sustainable debt 
write-down (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) must have 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼). ∎ 
In terms of Figure 3, for 𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦, even if 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼), we can always find a 𝑟𝑟′ s.t. 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) 
which would then entail  a debt write-down. 
3.2 Calibration 
A recent report by the Economic Commission for Africa (2020) notes that relative to an initial forecast of 3.2%, African 
growth rate in 2020 is likely to decline to 1.8 % (in the best case scenario), 0.1%  (in the middle case scenario) to -2.6% (in 
the worst case scenario). They also point out that the yield on 10-year government bonds varies from 11.03% for South 
Africa to 16.67% for Uganda. This has the immediate implication that a straightforward standstill will have little or no effect 
in ensuring debt sustainability for African countries. The same report suggests that total stock of outstanding debt in Africa 
is $400 billion and calls for $200 billion Covid 19 related funding for Africa (including low and middle income countries).  
Using the data reported in the above report, we carry out a simple calibration to quantify the impact of changes in investment 
𝐼𝐼 on the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured. We remind the reader that when 
1 + 𝑟𝑟′ 
𝐼𝐼 
𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) 
1 + 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼): Sustainable 
Debt Standstill 
𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 
 1 + 𝑟𝑟 > 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼): Unsustainable 
Debt Standstill 
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the upper bound is lower than one, this corresponds to a scenario where at least some of the debt being restructured takes 
the form of grants and involves a debt write-down.  
In calculating the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured, a key variable is the ratio 
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
 i.e. the ratio of investment to the initial bond issue. In this calibration exercise, we will assume that 𝐾𝐾 = $400 billion and 
vary 𝐼𝐼 (and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)) and calculate the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured to be 
1 + 𝑟𝑟′ = 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼).  
We set the no recovery annual growth rate to 0% (close to the middle case scenario of 0%) and 5% (the average growth 
rate across the African continent over the last decade) over as the annual growth rate in the recovery phase. It is also worth 
noting that ours is a two-period model where the last period is assumed to represent growth prospects in the medium term. 
So we when we talk about growth i.e. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) =
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻−𝑦𝑦�+�1−𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)��𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿−𝑦𝑦�
𝐼𝐼
, we will use compounded growth rates over a 
20 year period to calculate 
�𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻−𝑦𝑦�
𝐼𝐼
 and 
�𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿−𝑦𝑦�
𝐼𝐼
 respectively.    
Consider, first, a scenario where 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐾𝐾 = $200 billion.  Assuming that in this case, 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.99, we obtain that upper 
bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured is 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 1.2424. If, instead, we assume that 
𝐼𝐼 = $300 billion and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.95 then under the same assumptions on expected growth we obtain that  the upper bound 
on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured to be 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 1.0829. Next, we assume that 𝐼𝐼 = $200 
billion and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.85 then we obtain that  the upper bound on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably 
restructured to be 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 0.8664. Of course, if we assume that 𝐼𝐼 = $100 billion and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.65, then the upper 
bound on investment is on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably restructured to be 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 0.5706. The 
following table summarizes the calibration: 
 Upper bound on interest rate 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) 
𝐼𝐼 = $400 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.99 1.2424 
𝐼𝐼 = $300 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.95 1.0829 
𝐼𝐼 = $200 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛, 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.8 0.8664 
𝐼𝐼 = $100 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.99 0.5706 
    Table: Calibration Results 
So, the level of investment (including outstanding debt payments rolled over and fresh investment) has to be high enough 
to ensure that there is a positive interest rate at which sustainable debt restructuring can take place.  However, as the ratio 
of investment to the existing stock of bond issue becomes lower, there is no positive interest rate at which debt restructuring 
can take place and in practice, must include a mix of debt write down and additional finance in the form of outright grants 
and loans at very low interest rates.     
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In a recent report, the IMF (IMF 2020) points out that countries across Africa still face financing needs amounting to over 
$110 billion in 2020, with $44 billion still having to be financed; this estimate is lower than the numbers estimated by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. However, given our preceding analysis, whatever be the estimate of the 
financing needs, the key to restoring sustainability will be the intertest rate used. Our analysis suggests that initiatives such 
as the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Rapid Finance Initiative (RFI) which provides rapid concessional financial 
assistance with limited conditionality to low-income countries (LICs) facing an urgent balance of payments need with an 
emphasis on the country’s poverty reduction and growth objectives. Disbursements under RCF are at zero interest rates 
and our analysis suggests that such funding needs to be expanded by an order of magnitude. What is key though is that 
the money accessed under such an initiative is used by the country for its poverty reduction, public health and growth needs 
and not to bail out private creditors.  
3.3 Contingent Debt 
In our analysis so far we have made the assumption that the interest rate at which debt is not contingent on a future state 
of the world. This has the consequence that the sustainability constraint holds as in expected terms so that there could be 
a future state of the world where the restructured debt may not be repaid. To ensure that sustainability holds in all future 
states of the world, we need to consider contingent debt restructuring where the interest rate paid on sovereign debt is 
contingent on the state of the world that prevails. For example, the interest rate could be linked to future GDP or future 
export earnings. This leads us to the following question: can a contingent debt contract restore sustainability when a non-
contingent debt contract cannot?  
Formally, we define a contingent debt restructuring proposal as follows: 
Definition. The triple (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼) is a contingent debt restructuring proposal. It is admissible if both 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ > 0 and 1 +
𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′ > 0. 
For clarity of exposition, in this appendix, we will refer a debt structuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) as a non-contingent debt 
restructuring proposal.  
Consider what happens if creditors (as a group) choose to advance (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 to the sovereign via a contingent 
debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼). Debt sustainability requires that the following two inequalities simultaneously hold:  
(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ ) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝐼𝐼� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ )2𝐾𝐾 ≤  �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝐼𝐼� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦� 
The contingent return to the amount invested is  
𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) =
�𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝐼𝐼
=
𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻
𝐼𝐼
,𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) =
�𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝐼𝐼
=
𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼
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and the contingent rate of growth is  𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 1 and  𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) − 1. Note that 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) +
�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼))𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼). 
Given a contingent debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼), let 𝑟𝑟′ = 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′. A contingent debt 
restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼), has the same (expected) present value as a non-contingent debt restructuring proposal 
(𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) when 𝑟𝑟′ = 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′.  
The following proposition provides a basic characterization for a sustainable contingent debt restructuring proposal:   
Proposition: (a) A necessary condition for a triple  is a contingent debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼) to be sustainable 
is  1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) and 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼); the sufficient condition is that 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)− 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼), 0 <
𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) < 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) and 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼), 0 < 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) < 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼). (b) Moreover, any sustainable 
contingent debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼) must have a sustainable non-contingent debt proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with the 
same expected present value but the reverse may not be hold i.e. for  1 + 𝑟𝑟′ = 1 + 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′ ≤ 1 +
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − [𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) < 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼).  
Proof. Then proof of Part (a) follows the steps as the Proof of Proposition 1. Let  𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ ) (respectively, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 =
(1+𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′). Note that  we can rewrite the inequalities characterizing sustainability as  
𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼), 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) 
As both 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
≥ 0, we have that 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ ) ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) = 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) and 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′) ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) =
1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼). Next, let 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 (respectively, 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿. Instead of computing the roots of the 
equation 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
− 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) = 0 (respectively, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿2
𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
− 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 0), we compute the roots of the equation 
�𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)� + �𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)�
2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
− 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) = 0 (respectively, �𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)�+ �𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)�
2 𝐾𝐾
𝐼𝐼
−
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) = 0). The steps in the computation follow the same steps as in Proposition 1 for computing the roots of (2). To avoid 
needless repetition, we omit these steps and note that the admissible root where 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) > 0 
(respectively, 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)− 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) > 0) is given the expression 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)+
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾�−
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
 (respectively, 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)+
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾�−
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+4𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
. Hence, taking this root, we have that the present value of the restructured debt is non-negative 
in both states of the world and as the LHS of both (5a) and (5b) is increasing in 𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′ respectively, the conclusion follows. 
The proof part (b) is as follows. Note that 
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)[𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)] + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�[𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)− 𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)] = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − �𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)� 
Now:     
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𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) + 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾� − [𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾 )
2
>
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) + 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾� −
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
= 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) 
where the penultimate inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality for concave functions because  ��𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
2
+ 4𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
 is concave 
in 𝑦𝑦. Therefore, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − [𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)𝜀𝜀𝐻𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼)�𝜀𝜀𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼) < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼) − 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼) as required. ∎ 
The above proposition shows that any sustainable contingent debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻′ , 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿′, 𝐼𝐼) must have a 
sustainable non-contingent debt proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) with the same expected present value but the reverse may not be hold. 
The intuition is that the upper bound on the interest rate calculated in Propositions and 1 and 2 in the main text are concave 
in the expected growth rate.  
A key implication is that there cannot be a sustainable contingent debt restructuring proposal with the same expected 
present value as an unsustainable non-contingent debt restructuring proposal. Hence, faced with an unsustainable non-
contingent debt restructuring proposal, a sustainable contingent debt proposal must entail a debt write-down is expected 
terms or additional financing or both.  
 3.4 Private Creditor Participation 
A key issue with the kind of debt restructuring proposals we have discussed is the willingness of all creditors to participate 
in such a process. Although for the purposes of the formal analysis we have assumed that creditors, whether official or 
private, act collectively as a group, in practice this unlikely to be the case. Disbursements made by one group of creditors 
are used, by the debtor state, to make payments to another group of creditors. For instance, the Jubilee Debt Campaign 
have pointed out that 28 countries at high risk of debt default had received $11.3bn (£8.9bn) that would be used to meet 
private sector debt commitments (see https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jul/16/dollar-11bn-in-imf-covid-19-
money-being-used-to-service-debt-says-group-private-lendwers-poorest-nations). 
When a portion of disbursements is used to meet existing private sector commitments, then analysis of debt sustainability 
needs to be modified. As before, given (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), the present value of the refinanced debt will, as before, be 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾. If 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾] is 
used to payoff existing creditors, then in expected terms, the total resources available is 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 −
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦� where 𝑧𝑧′ ≤ 𝑧𝑧 (to allow for the possibility that private sector investment may be crowded in by debtor 
state when it meets its private sector debt commitments). Hence, for restructuring to be sustainable (in expected terms), we 
must have  
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�  
16 
 
so that expected growth is given by the expression:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧) =
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′)� �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋
=
𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′)
𝐼𝐼
 
Of course, unless 𝑧𝑧′ = 0, there conditions for sustainability are now going to be more restrictive:  
Proposition 4: A necessary and sufficient condition for an admissible debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) when  𝑧𝑧 ∈
[0, (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾] is used to payoff existing creditors and an amount 𝑧𝑧 − 𝑧𝑧′ ≥ 0 
is private sector investment is crowded in is 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) − 𝜀𝜀̃(𝐼𝐼, 𝑧𝑧′) where 0 < 𝜀𝜀̃(𝐼𝐼, 𝑧𝑧′) < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′). 
Proof. The proof essentially follows that of Proposition 1. Let 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼, 𝑧𝑧′) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) − 𝑥𝑥. Then, we can compute the 
admissible value of 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼, 𝑧𝑧′) to be 
𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼, 𝑧𝑧′) =
�2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) + 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾� −
�� 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�
2
+ 4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′)𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾
2
 
The conclusion follows.∎ 
As the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa notes private sector debt makes up a disproportionate share of the 
debt-servicing cost. For several African countries, even where debt levels remain relatively low, the interest cost now 
accounts for 20 percent or more of government revenues. Without significant private sector participation, the standstill will 
fall short of its objectives.  
We can use the calibration exercise in Section 3.2. to illustrate just how much restrictive matters can become. Consider the 
scenario where that 𝐼𝐼 = $100 billion and 𝑧𝑧 = $22 billion (half of the $44 billion in debt repayments due). Assuming 𝑧𝑧’ =
$20 billion (so that 𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′ = $80 billion) and 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑧𝑧′) = 0.55, we obtain that  the upper bound on the interest rate at 
which debt can be sustainably restructured to be 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 0.5186. Of course, if we assume that 𝐼𝐼 = $100 billion and 
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) = 0.65 (when 𝑧𝑧 = 0), then the upper bound on investment is on the interest rate at which debt can be sustainably 
restructured to be 𝑅𝑅�(𝐼𝐼) = 0.5706 > 0.5186.   
The key implication of the analysis carried out so far is the need for investment (including fresh financing) to ensure debt 
sustainability in the face of a severe negative shock like Covid 19. The assumption made so far is that all the investment 
made in the debtor state will be used for the purpose it is intended for i.e. maximize productive investments to increase the 
prospect of recovery. This assumption is moot.  
4. Debt and the Political Economy of Debtor State 
In this section, we consider the issue of debtor moral hazard from the perspective of its domestic political economy. Domestic 
agents are split into two groups, a minority elite and a majority non-elite. The domestic elite participate in international capital 
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markets and are organised to engage in collective political activity ((Olson (1965)). Taken together, these two assumptions 
imply that the resources appropriated by the elite cannot be used for debt repayments without their explicit consent. The 
non-elite cannot directly participate in international capital markets and, initially, are not organised to engage in collective 
political activity. Their payoffs are derived from solely from domestic national income.  
Conditional on a negative shock, we characterize the different incentives of the domestic elite and non-elite to deploy the 
investment made as part of the debt restructuring and show that effective participation by the domestic non-elite in the debt 
restructuring process will lead to sustainability and economic recovery.  
  4.1. Domestic Elite Incentives 
The population in the debtor state is normalised to one. Domestic non-elites constitute a majority and the domestic elites a 
minority. For ease of exposition, we will assume both elites and non-elites have risk neutral preferences over consumption 
in period 2.  
Suppose the creditors agree to a non-contingent debt proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼) where only elites participate in the debt restructuring 
process and have the power to divert 𝑥𝑥 from (from 𝐼𝐼) for their own benefit and moreover, such a decision is non-contractible 
as part of the debt restructuring process. This money is invested in a foreign asset with a return of 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 (where 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 could be 
equal to the lower bound 𝑟𝑟 > 0 on the interest rate at which debt can be restructured given by creditor participation 
constraints). In addition, the elites a fraction 𝛽𝛽 of any domestic output that is left over debt repayment has been made. 
Therefore, their payoffs from diverting resources 𝑥𝑥 from public investment is: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥�1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓�+ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥))𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 
where 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 = 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 and 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 �𝑦𝑦,𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 +
𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾�.  
The following proposition characterizes the decision made by the elite: 
Proposition 5: Given a debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), then the elite’s optimal choice to divert resources 𝑥𝑥∗ is 
characterized by the following: (i) if  �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� ≤ 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 −𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿), then 𝑥𝑥∗ = 0; (ii) if 𝑝𝑝′(0)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) ≤
�1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓�, 𝑥𝑥∗ = 𝐼𝐼; (iii) if 𝑝𝑝′(0)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) > �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� > 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿), 0 < 𝑥𝑥∗ < 𝐼𝐼,  
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥∗
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
> 0, 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
∗
𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼
= 1 and 
𝑥𝑥∗is non-decreasing in 𝑟𝑟′.  
Proof. By computation:  
𝐸𝐸′(𝑥𝑥) = �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� − 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 −𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿],𝑓𝑓′′(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿] 
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As 𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼) < 0, 𝐸𝐸′′(𝑥𝑥) < 0 so that the maximization problem is concave. Hence, if  �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� ≤ 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿), 
then 𝑥𝑥∗ = 0; if 𝑝𝑝′(0)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) ≤ �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓�, 𝑥𝑥∗ = 𝐼𝐼; if 𝑝𝑝′(0)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿) > �1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� > 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿), 
then 0 < 𝑥𝑥∗ < 𝐼𝐼. When 0 < 𝑥𝑥∗ < 𝐼𝐼, the FOC is  
�1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� = 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿] 
Let 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿. Then, taking the total derivate of the FOC w.r.t. 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 , 𝐼𝐼, 𝑥𝑥∗,𝑤𝑤 we obtain that  
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 = −𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥∗ + 𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼 + 𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤 
so that  
 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥∗
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
=
1
−𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 −𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]
> 0,
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥∗
𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼
=
𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]
𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿]
= 1   
Now, 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑝𝑝′′(𝐼𝐼−𝑥𝑥
∗)𝛽𝛽[𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻−𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿]
𝑝𝑝′(𝐼𝐼−𝑥𝑥∗)𝛽𝛽
> 0. Also, note that if 𝑦𝑦 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾, 
then 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 ; otherwise, 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 −𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 +
𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦. Hence, 𝑥𝑥∗ is weakly decreasing in 𝑟𝑟′ as required. ∎ 
Given Proposition 5, we need to modify the definition of sustainability. Given (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), the present value of the refinanced 
debt will, as before, be (1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾. In expected terms, given the elite decision to 
divert resources 𝑥𝑥∗, the total resources available is 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�. Hence, for 
restructuring to be sustainable (in expected terms), we must have  
(1 + 𝑟𝑟′) �(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋� + (1 + 𝑟𝑟′)2𝐾𝐾 ≤ 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)) �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦� 
so that expected growth is given by the expression:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) =
𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) �𝑦𝑦𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)� �𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦�
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐾𝐾 − 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋
=
𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)
𝐼𝐼
 
Proposition 1 needs to be restated as follows (the proof follows exactly the same steps as Proposition 4 and is omitted):   
Proposition 4’: A necessary condition for an admissible debt restructuring proposal (𝑟𝑟′, 𝐼𝐼), given the elite’s optimal choice 
to divert resources 𝑥𝑥∗ to be sustainable is  𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) ; the sufficient condition is 1 + 𝑟𝑟′ ≤ 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗) −
𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼, 𝑥𝑥∗) where 0 < 𝜀𝜀(𝐼𝐼, 𝑥𝑥∗) < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗). 
Evidently, Proposition 4’ is more restrictive than Proposition 1: when elites have the power to divert resources, then this 
restricts the set of sustainable debt restructurings.  
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4.2 Political Economy of Debt Restructuring 
Non-elites cannot access international capital markets with the immediate implication that even if they have the power to 
divert resources, they will choose not to do so as their payoffs are tied to the performance of the domestic economy and 
hence, the returns from investment.     
What factors determine whether the elite or the non-elite have the decision-making power to restructure debt? As the elite 
are organised (i.e. are able to act collectively in their own interests) and the non-elite aren’t, they will be the decision-makers. 
For the non-elite to acquire decision-making power, they must be able to organise to act collectively.  
Following Olson (1965), assume that an organisation successfully engages in collective political activity (such as a political 
party or a labour union) whose members are rewarded selectively. Each individual in the non-elite has the choice of 
becoming a party member; joining the party is costly and becomes a dominant strategy for an individual if and only if the 
number of other individuals joining the party is greater than a critical threshold. This suggests that there will be two possible 
outcomes in equilibrium, one where the non-elite are organised along party or union lines and are able to act collectively to 
grab the decision-making power over debt restructuring and one in which they remain disorganised and the decision-making 
power over debt restructuring agents remains vested in the elite. Which outcome prevails will depend on how non-elite 
individuals solve the underlying coordination problem.  
Let ∆= [𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥∗)](1 − 𝛽𝛽)[𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 −𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿] > 0 denote the net payoff gain to the non-elite (as a group) when 
investment is deployed to ensure economic recovery relative to the situation when it isn’t. Let 𝜋𝜋 denote the fraction of the 
non-elite who join the party. It will be assumed that the probability with which the non-elite get to decide whether or not debt 
is restructured is given by a function 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋), strictly increasing in 𝜋𝜋, with 𝑓𝑓(0) = 0 and 𝑓𝑓(1) ≤ 1. Given 𝜋𝜋 ∈ [0,1], the 
net payoff gain to a non-elite party member is 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆ − 𝑐𝑐 where 𝑐𝑐 is the cost of joining the party while the net payoff gain 
to a non-elite individual who is not a party member is 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆ where 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0 is a small non-negative number close to zero, 
strictly less than 1.  
Clearly if 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆, then it is a dominant action (strictly dominant when the inequality is strict) for no non-elite individual 
to join the party and engage in collective action.  
Suppose 0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋) < 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆. Then, there exists a function 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐), 0 < 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) < 1 such that that it is a dominant 
action for each non-elite individual to join the party if and only if 𝜋𝜋 > 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐), where 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) is the unique solution to the equation 
𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆ − 𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋). As 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋) is strictly increasing in 𝜋𝜋, 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) is strictly decreasing as a function of 𝑐𝑐.  
(i) When 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑓𝑓(1)∆, it is a dominant action for each non-elite individual not to join the party. Hence, only the elite have the 
decision-making power over debt restructuring. 
(ii) When 𝑓𝑓(1)∆> c, it is a dominant action for each non-elite individual to join the party. Hence, the non-elite have the 
decision-making power over debt restructuring with probability fmax. 
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(iii) When 0 ≤ γf(1)∆< c < f(1)∆, (a) if 𝜋𝜋 = 0, it is best response for each non-elite not to join the party, and (b) if 𝜋𝜋 =
1 it is a best response for each non-elite individual not to join the party. Hence, there are two Nash equilibria, one where no 
non-elite individual joins the party and one where all non-elite individuals joins the party. It remains to be seen which of the 
two equilibria will be selected?  
We will use the notion of a stochastically stable equilibrium (Young (1998)) to select between the two equilibria in the 
coordination game played by the non-elite. Let 𝐸𝐸 be an arbitrary finite normal form game with a set of 𝑁𝑁 players, an action 
set 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  for each player 𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,𝑁𝑁 and a payoff 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖:∏ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 → ℜ. Suppose each player believes that whenever any other 
player chooses to play a specific action, with probability 𝜃𝜃, 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1, she ends up choosing some other action in 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  . Let 
𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃) denote the perturbed game. A state in 𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃) is a profile of actions. For each state, let each player pick a best response 
to that state in 𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃) i.e. taking into account the possibility that other individuals will make a mistake with probability 𝜃𝜃. This 
defines a function 𝜎𝜎 from the set of states to itself. If there are many best responses, then there will be many such functions 
𝜎𝜎. When 𝜃𝜃 is small enough, let the set of 𝜎𝜎′𝑠𝑠 that remain best responses for all smaller 𝜃𝜃 be denoted by 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸). Any 𝜎𝜎 ∈
𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸). together with 𝜃𝜃 defines a Markov process over the set of states that is both irreducible and aperiodic and therefore 
has a unique steady-state distribution. A stochastically stable state is one which has positive probability under the limit of 
the steady state distribution of the preceding Markov process as 𝜃𝜃 goes to zero for any selection  𝜎𝜎 ∈ 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸). If a state is 
both a Nash equilibrium of 𝐸𝐸 and a stochastically stable, then it is said to be a stochastically stable equilibrium of 𝐸𝐸. 
The following proposition characterizes which equilibrium will be selected:  
Proposition 6. Suppose  0 ≤ 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥∆< 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥∆, then there are two equilibria, one with positive probability f(1) of 
party formation with full non-elite participation in the debt restructuring process and another with no party formation and no 
non-elite participation in debt restructuring process. The equilibrium where all non-elite individuals join the party is when 
𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) < 1
2
.  
Proof. As there is a continuum of non-elite individuals while the definition of stochastic stability presupposes a game with a 
finite number of players, we proceed as follows. Consider a sequence of finite grids contained in the mass of the non-elite 
individuals whose limit is the mass of non-elite individuals. Denote such a sequence of finite grids by 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� , 𝑗𝑗 ≥ 1. Let 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 =
#𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� . We call a sequence of finite grids admissible if (i) there is a threshold 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�, for each 𝑗𝑗 ≥ 1 such that 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗→∞
𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
=
𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐), (ii) the payoff to a party member is 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆ − 𝑐𝑐 if the number party members is greater than or equal to 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� and is −𝑐𝑐 
otherwise, (iii) the payoff to a non-party member is 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋)∆. We say that an equilibrium to be stochastically stable in the 
coordination game played by the non-elite, it must be the limit of the sequence of stochastically stable equilibria of all 
admissible sequences of finite grids converging to the mass of the non-elite. Fix 𝑗𝑗 and consider 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� . For 𝜃𝜃 small enough, if 
at least 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� non-elite individuals join the party, then the best response of each non-party member of the non-elite must be to 
choose join the party as well. Similarly, if at most 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1 join the party, then the best response of each non-party member 
must be not to join the party. In states where exactly  𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1 join the party, choosing either of the two options, join the party 
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or not join the party, are possible best responses for an individual belonging to the non-elite. It follows that that best 
responses differ only in states where the number of individuals choosing to join the party is exactly  𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1. Now, consider 
the associated Markov process for small 𝜃𝜃. There are two recurrent communication classes (for the definition of the terms 
"recurrent communication classes", "resistance" and "minimum stochastic potential", see Young (1998)), one where all non-
elite individuals choose to join the party (labelled a) and one in which all non-elite individuals choose not to join the party 
(labelled b). By Theorem 4 in Young (1993), only states in a recurrent communication class with least resistance will have 
positive probability weight in the limit of the steady state distribution of the Markov process as 𝜃𝜃 goes to zero. Consider the 
state b. Then, (i) there is a best response selection such that given 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 2 errors, the best response of each individual 
is to be in a and (ii) there is a best response selection such that given 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�+ 1 errors, the best response of each 
individual is to be in a. Therefore, the minimum resistance of leaving the state b, depending on the selection made, is either 
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 1 or 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 2. It follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the state b to the state a, 
depending on the best response selection made, is either 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 1 or 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 2. Next, consider the state a. Then, 
there is both a best response selection such that given 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in b, 
and a best response selection such that given 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 2 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in b. Therefore, 
the minimum resistance of leaving the state a, depending on the best response selection is either 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1 or 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 2. It 
follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the state a to the state b, depending on the best response 
selection made, is also either 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 1 or 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 2. The state b is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if 
both 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 1 < 𝑁𝑁�𝑗𝑗 − 1 and 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 − 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� + 2 < 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 2 or equivalently, both 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� >
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗+2
2
 and 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥� >
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗+4
2
. As 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗+2
2
 >
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗+4
2
 if 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�− 2 >
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
2
, the state a is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium. Rewriting these inequalities, it follows that 
state a is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if 𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥
�−2
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
> 1
2
. For any admissible sequence of finite grids, 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗→∞  
𝑁𝑁𝚥𝚥�−2
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
= 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) so that when 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) > 1
2
, the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all non-elite 
individuals do not join the party or conversely, when 𝜋𝜋�(𝑐𝑐) < 1
2
, the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all 
non-elite individuals join the party. ■ 
Proposition 6 sets out the conditions under which the non-elite, by organising themselves along party lines, engage in 
collective action to obtain decision-making power over the decision to restructure debt. First, the probability of successfully 
usurping decision-making power, conditional on being organised along party lines, is above a certain threshold (𝑓𝑓(1) > 𝑐𝑐
∆
). 
If, to the contrary, 𝑓𝑓(1) < 𝑐𝑐
∆
 is very low, then even when the non-elite are fully organised along party lines and able to 
engage in collective action cannot win the decision-making power to restructure debt. Anticipating such an outcome, no 
non-elite individual will decide to engage in collective in first place and the elite will retain decision-making power. Second, 
the cost paid each individual in the non-elite to engage in collective action is below a certain threshold (i.e. 𝑐𝑐 < 𝜋𝜋�−1(1
2
)). 
Note that 𝑐𝑐, the cost to each non-elite individual of engaging in collective political activity, is a measure of how democratic 
a country is. In particular, in a dictatorship, 𝑐𝑐 will be high while in a democracy 𝑐𝑐 will be lower in value. For moderate levels 
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of 𝑐𝑐, in Proposition 6, it is shown that each non-elite individual’s expectations on other non-elite individuals’ most likely 
course of action is that they will choose to participate; such a belief, when there are multiple equilibrium outcomes, acts as 
an equilibrium coordination device, inducing the non-elite individuals to their collective action problem. When the 𝑐𝑐 is very 
low in value it becomes a dominant action for each non-elite individual to participate in collective action.  
4.3. Reviving the UNCTAD Road Map for Africa 
The suggestion that the non-elite citizens affected by a sovereign debt crisis have claims that are justifiable and independent 
of the elite contests the assumption that a sovereign debtor should be thought of as a representative agent. In the time of 
the Covid 19 pandemic. Domestic elite has its own economic interests in a debt crisis which are distinct from domestic non-
elites whose interests are linked to sustainable debt restructuring.  
Our formal analysis implies that the participation in the debt restructuring process by citizens of the debtor state is key to 
restoring sustainability. This raises issues about the design of institutions that enhance the role of non-elite citizen groups 
in a debt restructuring. This is a point explicitly raised in the UNCTAD road map (UNCTAD 2015) that explicitly accounts for 
such a role at several points in the lead up to a debt restructuring.  
The motivation behind the UNCTAD roadmap was the ‘socialisation of losses from private debts and the subsequent 
emergence of sovereign debt crisis in developing and developed countries.’ (UNCTAD, pp. 3) The proposal aims to enhance 
‘coherence, fairness and efficiency of sovereign debt workouts.’ (Id.). The proposals set out ‘specific recommendations for 
each step of a sovereign debt workout.  
A key aspect of each recommendation is the explicit recognition and acknowledgement of civil society as an independent 
constituency whose interests are both distinct from those of the debtor government and the formal creditors. For instance, 
the principle of impartiality recognises that debt workouts need to be defined by a ‘neutral perspective particularly with 
regard to sustainability assessments and decisions about restructuring terms’ (UNCTAD, pp. 4) rather than as a procedure 
to fulfil the self-interest of either the debtors or the creditors. Further, the issue of ‘sustainability requires that sovereign debt 
workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner...while minimizing costs for economic and social rights and 
development in the debtor state.’ (Id.) Debt restructuring must restore debt sustainability which would then limit the problem.  
There are two ways in which an UNCTAD road map is reflects our analysis. First there is a recognition that there is a 
common interest between the debtor state, controlled by an elite with decision-making power over restructuring debt and 
international capital markets. Second, this interest is not shared by the domestic non-elite: hence the need for independent 
intervention by citizens of a debtor state.    
This leads us to suggest a revival of the UNCTAD road map for Africa as a key component of debt restructuring in response 
to Covid 19. As UNECA (2020) notes, several  African countries have come under the spotlight for governance-related 
matters: 24 African countries had Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores in the public sector 
management that below the African average of 3.1 (out of a maximum of 6).  
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Women, in particular, have been disadvantaged due to rising domestic violence, “the closure of schools and the diminished 
protection from governments create an enabling environment for child marriage and sex transactions between young girls 
and older men as a means of economic survival for families.” (UNECA 2020). Furthermore, 65% of nurses are women who 
are key workers at the frontline of delivery of health care services and they carry out the bulk of unpaid work in several 
countries (UNECA (2020)). The same report notes the need for a $15 billion fund for resourcing health care, targeted public 
health campaigns, protecting health workers, procurement of medical equipment and personal protective equipment  
through WHO and CDC.  
All of this suggests that women, public health practitioners, key workers, community groups, civil society organisations 
participate in the debt restructuring process to determine the financing needs of the debtor state, the interest rate at which 
the financing occurs as well as the use of the finance within the debtor state.  
However, our analysis results suggest that for the UNCTAD roadmap to work in practice, the institutions it creates must 
increase  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 and lower 𝑐𝑐. Only then will the domestic non-elite collectively organise to grab the opportunity to obtain 
decision-making power over debt restructuring.  
5. Conclusion 
Given the magnitude of the global negative shock resulting from the Covid 19 pandemic, how official and private external 
creditors respond to restructure debt for low income sovereign states is likely to have long lasting impacts on their prospects 
for recovery. In this paper, we have taken a first step towards providing a formal analysis of this problem. Our broad 
conclusions are as follows: (a) sustainable debt restructuring must involve a mix of debt write down and financing in the 
form of outright grants and loans at very low interest rates, and (b) participation in the debt restructuring process by 
community groups, civil society organisations is key to restoring sustainability. 
In future work, we plan to extend our formal analysis to more general settings with a focus on quantification and empirical 
analysis.   
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